State of Utah v. Ivan Larsen : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2003
State of Utah v. Ivan Larsen : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jeffrey S. Gray; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Counsel for
Appellee.
K. Andrew Fitzgerald; Office of the Public Defender; Counsel for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Larsen, No. 20031033 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4716
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
IVAN LARSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: Case No. 20031033-CA 
: (Incarcerated) 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED SEXUAL 
ABUSE OF A CHILD, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404.1(3) (1999), IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, GRAND COUNTY, THE HONORABLE 
LYLE R. ANDERSON PRESIDING 
K. Andrew Fitzgerald 
Office of the Public Defender 
55 E. 100 S. 
Moab, UT 84532 
Telephone (435) 259-0119 
Counsel for Appellant 
JEFFREY S. GRAY (5852) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone (801) 366-0180 
Counsel for Appellee FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
DEC f 0 2004 
IN IMI UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
IVAN LARSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20031033-CA 
(Incarcerated) 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED SEXUAL 
ABUSE OF A CHILD, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404.1(3) (1999), IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, GRAND COUNTY, THE HONORABLE 
LYLE R. ANDERSON PRESIDING 
K. Andrew Fitzgerald 
Office of the Public Defe; 
55 E. 100 S. 
Moab, UT 84532 
Telephone (435) 259-0119 
Coi> 
JEFFREY S. GRAY (5852) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone (801) 366-0180 
Counsel for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Authorities i 
Summary of Argument 1 
Argument 1-7 
Conclusion 7 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799 (Utah 1999) 6 
Statev. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1989) 2 
State v. Hales, 652?.2d 1290 (Utah 1982) 5 
Statev. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975) 5 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
IVAN LARSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
: Case No. 20031033-CA 
: (Incarcerated) 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant maintains all positions as they were originally set forth in his opening 
brief. Appellant responds to the State's brief as follows. 
The prosecutor's comments were improper because they were prefaced with 
language that asserts the prosecutor's personal opinion or knowledge concerning core 
issues of the case. Hence, the jury was exposed to matters they would not be justified in 
hearing in determining their verdict. 
Also, the improper comments probably influenced the jury's verdict due to their 
prejudicial nature. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS IN THE OPENING AND CLOSING 
STATEMNT CONSTITUTE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND 
PREJUDICED THE JURY IN REACHING A VERDICT. 
1 
First Statement or Opening Statement 
. .
 1H. _lVli;% • s |, luri"'- 'he prosecutor's opening 
statement was improper and prejudicial because it asserts the prosecutor's personal 
knowledge ;;•.*. , . . _ . « . . . , • . . \. - •• -• " j; - < -s 
s t r o n g a n d w -H -i'-.l \ n.- w ii! l v c o n v i n c e d a n d I wi l l . ,sk \ o u :o c o n \ l e t . " I r ^ i : i 
1 2 . h i i V i / / c ; ; ^ . o . . - M . > ,. . . i - - . : : ; • • . : 
assertion of personal knowledge ^r opinion about the facts b\ counsel is improper/" when 
the prosecutor repeatedly prefaced his statements with UI thinN.'' 
-i • ; «• *••' •*••--! -n. rrs Dihcl/o b\ nut addressing it, 
and asserts that the statement al issue is merely an oven icw of the case to be presented 
a i . . M a n I , ! * , - , : i • ; • . . • • * • . • : • - i 
give the jury an overview of the facts and evidence to be presented and perhaps the 
prosecutor's statement was argumentative. However, the prosecutor can not preiace au: 
overview of the case with the statement of "I think," and dually comment on the weight 
of the evidence by stating the evidence is strong. 
be presented and becom.es an assertion of personal knowledge and opinion deemed 
improper and prejudicial h\ I llali. .minis 
Second Statement or The Mother's Competency as a Mother 
Again, regarding the pi oseci rtor's i lse of the tei ins "'I thii ik," and i, i 111 \ • >|, 1111,. n, ' 
the State attempts to minimize the prejudicial and improper effect of the comments. I he 
statement at issue is pro\ iu^d
 t»^  iv-dows, 
[I]n my opinion .... • * guess everybody ha- a diiiercm opinion .ivout what 
somebody says, but a mother who keeps track of a child knows when they're at 
liic neiuhl KM ' s 'house, knows who they're playing with, checks on ' em every half 
an hour or so is. to me, being fairly responsible. I don ' t think that Barbara 
Butterfield could have done anything, could have recognized before the fact that 
her husband was going to abuse her daughter and could have saved her from 
that." 
^~ 145.7.IO 
in..! • -, K\,o acknowledge the clear precedence of Dibello. Secondly, t lv Su ic 
asserts that the prosecutor did not suggest that he had personal knowledge v-1 liic aouse 
ai id again argue s tl lat the pi oseci ltoi w as n ierel> draw ing a perm Issible deduction from 
the evidence. Clearly, the prosecutor did noi sa\ . "1 personalh know that abuse took 
place." \M.. ;.;, „•;;.J-...:.., itoi • : •.**'.• ' • 
evidence. However, the statements were prefaced with "in my opinion" and "I don' t 
think." Therefore, the statements made b> the prosecutor become more than mere 
dedi ictions, arid become personal opinions and personal knowledge. In essence, a 
statement that is relatively benign becomes authoritative and a personal opinion when 
prefaced ;> • 1.1:1 1.' 'I tl lii ilk' '*" : 1 ' ' "ii it 1 n y opinioi 1." 
. In fact, as previously stated, the comment "I don ' t think that Barbara Butterfield 
coaid ii;i\*j done anun ing , could ha\ e recognized before tl le fact that her 1 11 lsband v as 
going to abuse her daughter and could have saved her from that," is not a benign 
statement simply about whether or not iU\ • -ara 1 suuei 1 K .,* was a compeiem m o m u . » 
is ;•• a niment infused with prosecutor 's personal knowledge as to the ultimate issue of the 
case . . . the defendant 's guilt. 
J • u ^ 
closing argument with statements ol personal knowledge and personal opinion. ! -, 
result is lliai ilie piuseculoi .• .•;,.* 1 M K . \ :. 
guilt. Hence, the jurors' attention was called to matters they were not justified in 
considering in determining their verdict and were probably influenced by those matters. 
Third Statement or The Mother's Testimony 
During closing argument, the prosecutor refers to the defense's cross-examination 
of Barbara Butterfield. "Ah, counsel tried to get Mz. Butterfield to admit things. He 
said, "Now didn't - isn't this what she - isn't this what, ah, Amber said in this? Isn't this 
what she said?" That's not what I remember."' Tr. 145:12-15. 
The State claims that this statement is a paraphrase of Barbara Butterfield's 
testimony and hence is proper. Indeed, the prosecutor very well may have been 
paraphrasing. However, the paraphrasing was followed by "That's not what I 
remember." Again, the State attempts to minimize the effect of the language used by the 
prosecutor. Here the prosecutor uses the first person "I" to suggest that a piece of 
evidence or fact did not happen. On its face, the use of "I" is problematic, further 
compounded when the statement becomes one of creating a false impression or an 
impression of the personal knowledge of the prosecutor. 
In essence, the prosecutor's statement was proper until concluded with a personal 
opinion as to what the prosecutor personally recalled. 
Fourth Comment or Medical Evidence 
Furthermore, during closing argument, the prosecutor made the following 
comment. 
Medical evidence. Ladies and gentlemen, that's gonna come under the 
category that I said of some of these other things. Maybe you're wondering why 
there's no medical evidence. But - but if there are medical reports in that file that 
talk about this thing, it's just as easy for the defense to subpoena those witnesses 
as it is for the prosecution. If I don't feel that kind of evidence is gonna help you 
in our decision, then I don't subpoena that witness. Tr. 146:16-23. 
Now why would medical evidence possibly not help in a decision? If we have a 
Medical Examiner take a look at a little girl and they say, "We've examined this 
girl and we can't either affirm or preclude what her statements are. We can't say 
yes or no," then that doesn't really help you, does it? Get somebody down here 
from Salt Lake City to tell you, "We can't say yes or no," means you know what? 
Tr. 146:24-25 & 147:1-5. 
Let me make another point. If I get a rape victim that was raped yesterday and we 
have her examined, then what we have is things like cuts, bruises, swelling so 
forth. If this person was abused two weeks ago and they examined her, then 
maybe they say, "You know what? The opening's consistent with having been 
penetrated, but we can't - there's not bruising. We can't say that he did it. We 
can't say that it was done by an arrow. Tr. 147:6-13 
So why do they want you to think about medical evidence, ladies and gentlemen? 
And if we're gonna raise a reasonable doubt about that, ladies and gentlemen, it's 
supposed to be something more than fancy imagination or wholly speculative 
possibility. You don't have any medical evidence supports the fact that this girl 
wasn't abused. Tr. 147: 14-19. 
Concerning these comments, the State relies on State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1291 
(Utah 1982) citing State v. Kazda, 540 P.2e 949, 951 (Utah 1975) and argues that "A 
prosecutor has the duty and right to argue the case based on the total picture shown by the 
evidence or the lack thereof, including reference to the paucity or absence of evidence 
adduced by the defense." Standing alone, the Appellant does not dispute this notion.1 
However, Hales offers no further elaboration or application of the principle. 
In contrast, in State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d at 951, the court elaborates and states that 
[t]he other side of this proposition is: that the prosecutor, and the public, whose 
interest he represents, should and does have a right to argue the case upon the 
basis of the total picture shown by the evidence or the lack thereof. If either 
counsel cannot voice a challenge to the effect of the total evidence, then one is 
made to wonder, what may he talk about? It is our opinion that it is not only the 
prerogative, but the duty of either counsel, to analyze all aspects of the evidence; 
and this should include any pertinent statements or deductions reasonably to be 
1
 It is important to note that Kazda and Hales are cases where the primary issue before the court was 
whether the prosecutor's comments to the jury that the defendant failed to testify violated the defendant's 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
drawn therefrom as to what the evidence is or is not, and what it does or does not 
show. 
The State correctly states that it was counsel for the defendant that brought up the issue of 
no medical evidence and that the prosecutor responded to defense counsel's closing 
argument.2 Defense counsel's argument concerning lack of medical evidence appears 
consistent with Kazda because defense counsel is pointing out lack of evidence. 
However, a full reading of the prosecutor's statements concerning the medical evidence 
reveals that the prosecutor went beyond giving the jury a total picture of the case to 
presenting, for the first time, medical evidence. 
Comment Five & Six 
Finally, the prosecutor concluded closing argument with the comments 
If you have had a doubt raised, you have to be able to say to yourself, "How is 
that - have I had some kind of a doubt draw into this thing, based upon itself 
evidence that I heard?" I say that you haven't ladies and gentlemen.'" Tr. 22-25. 
Ah, my belief is that the evidence in this case from Amber Larsen, from all of her 
statements, from her interviews is -overwhelming. The elements of this case 
have been met." Tr. 149:2-5. 
The State cites numerous cases to contest the simple reading of these comments. And 
yet, the State's own case, State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799, 817 (Utah 1999) concludes that 
"it is true that a prosecutor engages in misconduct when he or she expresses personal 
opinion or asserts personal knowledge of the facts." Specifically, the prosecutor states in 
the case at hand, "Ah, my belief is that the evidence in this case . . . is overwhelming." 
Tr. 149:2-5 and "I say that you haven't ladies" when referring to whether or not there is 
reasonable doubt. Thus, clearly, the prosecutor, as an authority figure is expressing his 
2
 The State cites State v Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799 (1999), where the court reasoned that comments made by 
the prosecutor were not improper because they did not convey the prosecutor's personal belief. 
own personal opinion or knowledge as it relates to the facts and the ultimate conclusions. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellant respectfully requests that the Appellant's 
conviction be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th, day of December, 2004. 
2r 
K. ANDREW FITZQEJKALD 
Attorney for Defen 
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